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 Nontechnical Summary 
 
From 1 January 2005 onwards the European Union has launched the first large-scale 
international emissions trading program. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in 
principle has the opportunity to advance the role of market-based policies in environmental 
regulation and to form the basis for future European and international climate policies. 
The EU-ETS under the European Burden Sharing Agreement implies a hybrid regulation 
scheme as sectors of domestic economies that are not covered by the emissions trading 
scheme require complementary emission regulation. Under such a hybrid scheme, the 
domestic regulator must have perfect information on the international price of tradable 
emission allowances as well as the emission abatement possibilities across all domestic 
emission sources in order to implement a cost-minimizing abatement policy.  
In this paper, we demonstrate that a lack of central planner information may seriously limit 
the efficiency of hybrid regulation. The deficiency of hybrid regulation becomes particularly 
policy-relevant when the distributional constraints for the design of the EU-ETS are taken 
into account. In fact, the EU-ETS has been only approved by EU Member States under the 
condition that emission allowances to sectors covered by the trading scheme are handed out 
for free. Whereas lump-sum grandfathering of allowances would not interfere with overall 
efficiency in a single comprehensive emission market, this is no longer the case with hybrid 
markets. Numerical simulations based on empirical data for Germany illustrate impending 
large efficiency losses if allowance allocation to EU-ETS sectors exceeds the efficient level. 
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Abstract. From 1 January 2005 onwards the European Union has launched the first large-
scale international carbon emissions trading program. As the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU-ETS) covers only part of domestic carbon emissions, it implies a hybrid environmental 
regulation scheme: Each EU Member State must specify additional domestic abatement 
policies for the sectors that are not covered by the emissions trading scheme in order to meet 
its emissions budget under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement. Based on numerical 
simulations for Germany, we illustrate the efficiency drawback of hybrid carbon regulation 
which becomes particularly relevant when distributional constraints of the current EU-ETS 
design are taken into account.  
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1 Introduction 
Since long, economists have advocated the efficiency advantages of market-based instruments, 
i.e., emission taxes or tradable emission allowances over command-and-control standards. The 
basic reasoning behind this is that taxes or tradable allowances can achieve the same marginal 
costs for each use of a given pollutant so that the economy as a whole will employ the cheapest 
abatement options. While a deliberate design of standards could in principle also achieve cost-
effective abatement, the fundamental advantage of market-based regulation is that cost-
efficiency can be obtained by decentralized market mechanisms: There are no information 
requirements for the regulator on the specific abatement options across different pollution 
sources to assure equalization of marginal abatement costs.  
During the last decade, in particular emission taxes have played a growing role in domestic 
environmental policies of OECD countries - not at least because efficiency arguments 
promoted overall political feasibility (OECD 2001). The most recent prominent example for 
the market-based course in environmental policy design is the European Union’s Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) being in force since the first of January 2005 (EU 2003a). Its key 
objective is to foster cost-efficiency of carbon reduction under the EU Burden Sharing 
Agreement (EU-BSA) that entails specific emission reduction targets across EU Member 
States (EU 1999) in line with the EU’s overall reduction commitment under the Kyoto 
Protocol.1 
Initially, the EU-ETS will only cover carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from selected energy-
intensive sectors including: production and processing of iron and steel; production of cement, 
glass, or ceramic; energy transformation (electricity generation and oil refineries). According 
to Article 10 of the EU-ETS-Directive, emission allowances to these sectors will be 
grandfathered, i.e. given for free.2 Each Member State is obligated to set up a National 
                                                          
1 Under the Kyoto Protocol the EU is committed to cut its annual greenhouse gas emissions during 
2008-2012 by 8 % on average as compared to 1990 emission levels (UNFCCC 1997). 
2 More specifically, Member States must allocate at least 95 % of emission allowances for free in the 
“warm-up” phase from 2005 to 2007. In the next phase - from 2008 to 2012 - this threshold can be 
reduced to 90 %, whereas the ceilings for later phases have been not yet decided upon. 
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Allocation Plan (NAP) where it defines the cap on emission allowances for sectors 
(installations) included in the trading scheme and the specific allocation rule for 
grandfathering. The NAPs had to be submitted to the EU Commission by April 2004 for 
official review and approval. 
As the EU-ETS covers only a part of CO2 emission sources, it implies a hybrid environmental 
regulation scheme. Each Member State must complement the EU-ETS with specific domestic 
abatement policies for the sectors that are not covered by the emissions trading scheme in 
order to meet the country’s total emissions budget under the EU-BSA. The segmentation of the 
emission market into multiple domestic markets and a single international market creates a 
fundamental information problem for environmental regulation that seems to be widely 
ignored in the public policy debate: Under a hybrid scheme, the domestic regulator must have 
perfect information on the international price of tradable emission allowances and the marginal 
abatement cost curves across all domestic emission sources in order to implement the (single) 
cost-minimizing NAP. Hence, hybrid emission regulation as implied by the EU-ETS discards a 
key element of market-based regulation, i.e. the rigorous use of decentralized market 
mechanisms. 
In this paper, we investigate the potential efficiency costs of hybrid carbon emission 
regulation. We start with a simple analytical partial equilibrium framework to demonstrate the 
fundamental problem of hybrid regulation. We then quantify the excess costs of hybrid 
regulation for Germany using marginal carbon abatement cost curves based on empirical data.   
Our analysis complements recent research on the economic impacts of the EU-ETS that 
emphasized the distortionary effects of dynamic (updating) allocation rules (see e.g. Böhringer 
and Lange 2005a) or competitive distortions between similar energy-intensive firms across EU 
Member States (see e.g. Böhringer and Lange 2005b). This paper highlights the fundamental 
information problems and induced efficiency costs of hybrid carbon regulation from the 
perspective of national authorities. 
3 
2 Stylized Analysis 
Under the EU-BSA, a Member State must comply with a country-specific emissions budget E . 
With international emissions trading, efficient national regulation comes down to minimizing 
compliance costs as the sum of abatement costs Ci(ei) across all domestic sectors i and the 
costs of buying emission allowances from the international market at an exogenous price p :3  
( ) ( )∑ ∑ −+i i iiie EepeCMini  
The associated first-order condition states that marginal abatement costs are equalized across 
all sectors at the international emissions price: 
i
i
e
Cp ∂
∂−=  
From the perspective of the national regulator, the efficient solution can be decentralized by 
implementing an open emissions trading scheme where the national emissions budget E  is 
auctioned or grandfathered. In this way, the national authority does neither require any 
information on domestic abatement technologies (i.e., the marginal costs of domestic 
abatement options) nor on the international emissions price: The cost-efficient abatement 
across sectors together with exports or imports of emission allowances are implicitly 
determined by decentralized market mechanisms. For hybrid emission regulation under the 
EU-ETS, however, the national regulator must know both – the international carbon value p  
as well as (marginal) abatement cost curves for all domestic emission sources – in order to 
partition the national emissions budget E  into cost-efficient segments 
*
DIRE  for the EU-ETS 
sectors (thereafter referred to as DIR sectors that are covered by the ETS-Directive) and 
* *
NDIR DIRE E E= −  for the remaining sectors of the domestic economy (thereafter referred to as 
NDIR sectors that are not covered by the ETS-Directive). Furthermore, the hybrid approach 
                                                          
3 As usual, ∂Ci/∂ei≤0 and ∂2Ci/∂ei2>0 where ei denote emissions by sector i. Countries are assumed to be 
price takers on the international emission market. 
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destroys the flexibility for grandfathering policies even if perfect information would be 
available: The efficient level of *DIRE  constitutes the upper bound at which emission 
allowances to EU-ETS sectors could be given for free (lump-sum) without reducing overall 
efficiency. 
Figure 1 illustrates the impending excess costs of hybrid market regulation. The aggregate 
marginal abatement cost curve for DIR sectors is denoted by /DIR iC e−∂ ∂ and for NDIR 
sectors by /NDIR iC e−∂ ∂ respectively; the two marginal cost curves add up to the overall 
marginal abatement cost curve / iC e−∂ ∂ . The intersection of the international emissions price 
p  with the marginal abatement cost curves determines the optimal partitioning of the overall 
emissions budget E : NDIR sectors should comply with an emissions constraint *NDIRE  
whereas the remaining emissions budget ** NDIRDIR EEE −=  should be allocated to the DIR 
sectors. If domestic marginal abatement costs to reach the overall emission target E are below 
the international emissions price, the region becomes an exporter of emission allowances (as 
sketched in Figure 1) with optimal domestic emissions *E below the mandated emissions 
budget E ; otherwise, the region becomes an importer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Optimal emissions in NDIR and DIR sectors at an international emissions price p  
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The efficient solution could be decentralized by imposing uniform emission taxes at the 
international permit price p  on the NDIR sectors that are not eligible for international 
emissions trading. The remaining emissions budget, *NDIRE E− , would be allocated to the 
DIR sectors that are eligible for international emissions trading. The optimal fraction of the 
emissions budget to be allocated to DIR sectors amounts to 
( )* ** / /NDIR DIRE E E E Eθ = − = . Depending on the business-as-usual emissions 0DIRE  for 
DIR sectors, the optimal fulfillment factor *λ  which reports the fraction of business-as-usual 
emissions that are freely allocated as allowances equals * 0/DIR DIRE E . In policy practice, 
partitioning of E  will generally deviate from efficient values *λ  due to inherent information 
problems.4 These deviations will induce efficiency losses as indicated by the shaded areas abc 
(if the international emissions price ?p  presumed by the national authority is above the actual 
international price p ) or bde (if the international emissions price ?p  presumed by the national 
authority is below the actual international price p ). 
3 Numerical Model and Parameterization 
In order to provide empirical estimates for the magnitude of efficiency losses induced by 
hybrid carbon regulation, we transform our stylized analytical framework into a simple 
numerical model based on marginal abatement cost curves for Germany.  
These curves represent the marginal costs of reducing carbon emissions by different amounts 
within a sector. Marginal costs of abatement may vary across sectors due to differences in 
carbon intensity, initial energy price levels, or the ease of carbon substitution possibilities.  
For the empirical specification of sector-specific marginal abatement costs curves we adopt a 
flexible polynomial function of third degree:  
                                                          
4 Obviously, lobbying of interest groups for generous allocations of allowances provides a further reason 
for deviations. 
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where 'iC  are the marginal costs of reducing carbon emissions in sector i, ioe are the business-
as-usual emissions, and ei are the actual emissions, i.e., )( io ee i −  denotes the level of 
abatement. In order to determine the coefficients ia ,1 , ia ,2 , and ia ,3 , we employ a least-square 
procedure based on a sufficiently large number of discrete observations for marginal 
abatement costs and the associated emission reduction in each sector. These values are 
generated with PACE – a standard multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium 
model of international trade and energy use (see e.g. Böhringer 2000, 2001, 2002 for 
applications and algebraic documentation) based on GTAP5 data (see Dimaranan and 
McDougall 2002).5 Table 1 provides a summary of least-square estimates for the coefficients 
of marginal abatement cost curves for DIR and NDIR sectors in Germany. 
Table 1: Coefficients for sector-specific marginal abatement cost functions in Germany 
Directive Sectors (DIR) Non-Directive Sectors (NDIR) 
1,DIRa  2,DIRa  3,DIRa 1,NDIRa 2,NDIRa  3,NDIRa
1.60372 0.00318 0.00042 5.76568 0.08324 0.00095
 
The numerical model is implemented in GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus 1987) using 
PATH (Dirkse and Ferris 1995) as a solver. The algebraic model formulation is given in 
Appendix A. The GAMS programming code is provided in Appendix B. 
4 Scenarios and Results 
Table 2 summarizes the evolution of emissions and emission reduction requirements for 
Germany vis-à-vis the EU average based on most recent business-as-usual projections by the 
EU (EU 2003b). 
                                                          
5 We perform a series of model calculations with stepwise increases in sectoral emissions constraints for 
Germany which deliver pairs of emission abatement and associated marginal abatement costs used 
subsequently as input for the least-square approximation of continuous marginal abatement cost curves. 
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Obviously, the effective reduction targets under the EU-BSA can change dramatically along 
the business-as-usual development.6 Germany committed itself under the EU-BSA to an 
emissions reduction target of 21 % compare to 1990 emission levels. Against business-as-usual 
emission levels in 2005, the effective reduction requirement only amounts to 8.7 %.7  
Table 2: CO2 emissions and reduction requirements (EU 2003b)  
 CO2 emissions (in Mt) Reduction requirements (in %)  
 1990 2005 1990 2005 
Germany 943.0 815.6 21.0 8.7 
EU-15 (total) 3071.5 3140.2 8.6 10.6 
 
In order to illustrate the excess costs for hybrid carbon regulation, we plot Germany’s 
compliance costs as a function of the international CO2 price and the domestic fulfillment 
factorλ . The latter has been a central parameter of negotiations between the national 
regulatory authorities and the DIR sectors covered by the EU-ETS. Obviously, the DIR sectors 
had a strong incentive to lobby for large fulfillment factors in order to reduce effective 
reduction requirements vis-à-vis their business-as-usual emissions. A review of NAPs that 
have been approved so far by the EU Commission indicates rather generous allocation of 
emission allowances to the DIR sectors with λ  being close or even beyond 1 (Gilbert et al. 
2004). As to Germany, the fulfillment factor is 1, i.e., the DIR sectors are more or less 
endowed with their business-as-usual emissions. 
Figure 2 provides a contour plot of total compliance costs for Germany across a meaningful 
range of international CO2 prices and fulfillment factors: (i) Reflecting broad consensus of 
carbon market analysts, international CO2 prices will not exceed 20 € per ton of CO2 in the 
initial phase of the EU-ETS, and (ii) fulfillment factors for Germany range between 0.8 and 1 
                                                          
6 We apply the EU Burden Sharing Agreement covering all greenhouse gases to CO2 only which is by 
far the most important greenhouse gas within the EU.  
7 The major source for the decrease in emissions since 1990 can be traced back to so-called wall-fall 
profits in the context of Germany’s reunification with a sharp decline in East-Germany’s emission-
intensive production together with more efficient energy transformation utilities. 
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covering efficient fulfillment factors (as an endogenous function of the international CO2 
price) as well as the negotiated fulfillment factor of 1. 
 
Figure 2: Total compliance costs for Germany (mill. €2002) 
 
The marked solid line in Figure 2 reports the minimal compliance costs for Germany given 
alternative international CO2 prices p and the associated efficient choice *λ  of the fulfillment 
factor. At a given international CO2 price, compliance costs become the higher, the more the 
national authority deviates from the efficient fulfillment factor – this explains the U-shaped 
hull around the minimum cost line. Total excess costs of sub-optimal choices for λ emerge as 
the difference between compliance costs for the respective λ  and the minimum costs for *λ . 
Total compliance costs are composed of direct abatement costs for all sectors and the value of 
emission allowances that can be traded via the DIR sectors. Whenever λ  deviates from *λ  the 
marginal abatement costs in NDIR sectors are no longer equalized with marginal abatement 
costs in DIR sectors – the latter always coinciding with the international emissions price p. If 
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λ  is higher than *λ , which is actually the case for Germany over the whole selected range of 
international emissions prices, the effective reduction burden for NDIR sectors becomes more 
stringent leading to higher marginal abatement costs than p and an increase in NDIR 
compliance costs. While the DIR sectors gain and may even achieve substantial net revenues 
from carbon exports, total compliance costs for DIR and NDIR sectors go up.8  
Figures 3 and 4 decompose the total compliance costs into the components for NDIR and DIR 
sectors. In both figures, the minimum cost line for efficient NAPs is marked. Compliance costs 
for NDIR sectors are equal to the sum of direct abatement costs across these sectors, whereas 
compliance costs for DIR sectors in addition include the value of exported or imported CO2 
allowances. The shape of NDIR compliance costs is straightforward: Independent of the 
international allowance price, abatement costs of NDIR sectors are determined by the effective 
reduction requirement associated with the choice ofλ . We can see that NDIR compliance 
costs sharply increase inλ , thereby reflecting empirical evidence on costly abatement options 
in important segments of the domestic economy such as traffic and transportation that are not 
covered by the EU-ETS. In turn, compliance costs in DIR sectors at a given international price 
decrease in λ  rendering negative costs (or likewise net revenues) via permit exports if free 
allowance allocation is sufficiently high. 
The value of allowance trade is illustrated in Figure 5. Whenever this value drops to zero, the 
associated fulfillment factor λ  characterizes an autarky situation for the given international 
emissions price p.  
 
                                                          
8 The same logic applies, if λ  was lower than *λ : Here the marginal abatement costs for NDIR sectors 
drop below p, thereby reducing NDIR compliance costs at the expense of diminishing gains from 
emissions trading for the DIR sectors. 
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Figure 3: Compliance costs of DIR sectors in Germany (mill. €2002) 
 
Figure 4: Compliance costs of NDIR sectors in Germany (mill. €2002) 
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Figure 5: Value of allowance trade (mill. €2002) 
 
The decomposition of compliance costs for DIR and NDIR sectors not only provides useful 
information on the sources of excess costs from hybrid regulation but also de-masks an 
important equity dimension: A generous allocation of free emission allowances to DIR sectors 
may fully shift the burden of emission reduction under the EU-BSA to the NDIR sectors (see 
Böhringer at al. 2005) whereas DIR sectors may be better off compared to business-as-usual. 
For concreteness, consider an international permit price of 10 € per ton of CO2: With an 
efficient *λ  , total compliance costs for Germany amount to 305 mill. €2002 as the sum of DIR 
costs (260.2 mill. €2002) and NDIR costs (44.8 mill. €2002). If the fulfillment factor is chosen at 
1, total compliance costs more than quadruple to 1,362.8 mill. €2002. Apart from the large 
excess costs, the change in compliance costs between DIR and NDIR sectors vis-à-vis the 
efficient solution is dramatic: NDIR sectors have to bear a burden of 1,578,7 mill. €2002, 
whereas DIR sectors earn 215.9 €2002 through exports of free allowance. 
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Our graphical exposition does not only visualize the excess costs and distributional impacts of 
inefficient choices forλ , it also illustrates the impending excess costs of hybrid regulation due 
to the lack of central planner information: Differences between various points on the minimum 
cost line provide information on the excess costs of hybrid carbon regulation when the national 
regulatory assumes the “wrong” international emissions price for pursued efficient partitioning 
of the national emissions budget. If, e.g., the national regulator expects an international CO2 
price at 10 € per ton of CO2 and the “real” market price should materialize at 15 € per ton of 
CO2, the implied excess costs amounts to 23.6 €2002 which constitutes a cost premium of 8.9 % 
above the central planner’s minimum costs. 
 
5 Conclusions 
From 1 January 2005 onwards the European Union has launched the first large-scale 
international emissions trading program. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in 
principle has the opportunity to advance the role of market-based policies in environmental 
regulation and to form the basis for future European and international climate policies. 
In this paper, we have highlighted a central pitfall of the current EU-ETS that could seriously 
limit its efficiency thereby weakening arguments for a market-based regulation course. The 
EU-ETS under the European Burden Sharing Agreement implies a hybrid regulation scheme 
as sectors of domestic economies that are not covered by the emissions trading scheme require 
complementary emission regulation. Under a hybrid scheme, the domestic regulator must have 
perfect information on the international emissions price as well as the (marginal) abatement 
cost curves across all domestic emission sources in order to implement the single cost-
minimizing abatement policy. Therefore, the current EU policy design for emission abatement 
discards a central element of market-based regulation, i.e. decentralized markets that 
autonomously achieve efficient use of scarce resources. 
The pitfall of hybrid regulation becomes particularly policy-relevant when we account for 
distributional constraints. As a matter of fact, the EU-ETS has been only approved by EU 
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Member States under the condition that emission allowances to sectors covered by the trading 
scheme are handed out for free. Whereas lump-sum grandfathering of allowances would not 
interfere with overall efficiency in a single comprehensive emission market, this is no longer 
the case with hybrid markets. Our numerical simulations based on empirical data for Germany 
have illustrated the impending large excess costs of hybrid regulation if allowance allocation to 
EU-ETS sectors deviates from the efficient level. 
The deficiency of current EU emission regulation, however, should not be construed as an 
argument against emissions trading or market-based instruments per se. The problems arise 
from hybrid regulation that creates separate emission markets. As a consequence, the EU-ETS 
should be expanded in the future to include all domestic sectors of EU economies thereby 
creating a single emission market.  
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Appendix A: Algebraic Model Formulation 
Cast as a planning problem, our model corresponds to a nonlinear program that seeks a cost-
minimizing abatement scheme subject to initial emission allocation and institutional 
restrictions for emissions trading at the sectoral level. The nonlinear optimization problem can 
be interpreted as a market equilibrium problem where prices and quantities are defined using 
duality theory. In this case, a system of (weak) inequalities and complementary slackness 
conditions replace the minimization operator yielding a so-called mixed complementarity 
problem (see e.g. Rutherford 1995). 
Two classes of conditions characterize the (competitive) equilibrium for our model: zero profit 
conditions and market clearance conditions. The former class determines activity levels 
(quantities) and the latter determines prices. The economic equilibrium features 
complementarity between equilibrium variables and equilibrium conditions:9 activities will be 
operated as long as they break even, positive market prices imply market clearance – otherwise 
commodities are in excess supply and the respective prices fall to zero.  
In the generic setting – laid out below - each model sector faces a specific emissions constraint 
vis-à-vis the business-as-usual situation. Without institutional restrictions on the scope of 
“where”-flexibility, each sector can trade emissions with other domestic sectors (domestic 
market) or the international market at an exogenous international emissions price. Arbitrage 
(zero-profit conditions) determines the efficient level of emission abatement and emission 
imports or exports at the sectoral level. In the simulations of hybrid regulation under the EU-
ETS, sectors that are not eligible for international emissions trading are excluded from exports 
and imports to the international market (the respective decision variables are fixed to zero and 
the associated equilibrium conditions are dropped). This will in general drive apart the 
marginal abatement costs for sectors outside the EU-ETS and those sectors that can trade 
internationally.  
                                                          
9 In our algebraic exposition, the variable associated with each equilibrium condition is added in 
brackets and denoted with an orthogonality symbol (⊥ ). 
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Table A.1 summarizes the notations for variables and parameters. 
Table A.1: Variables and parameters 
Variables: Activity levels 
iD  Emission abatement by sector i  
iMD  Imports of emission allowances by sector I from domestic market 
iXD  Exports of emission allowances by sector I to domestic market  
iM  Imports of emission allowances by sector i from international market 
iX  Exports of emission allowances by sector i to international market  
Variables: Price levels 
iP  Marginal abatement costs by sector i 
PD  Price of domestically tradable allowances 
Parameters 
Targeti Effective carbon emission reduction requirement for sector i  
1, 2, 3,, ,i i ia a a  Coefficients of marginal abatement cost function for sector i  
P  Exogenous international emissions price 
 
Zero Profit Conditions 
1. Abatement by sector i (⊥ iD ): 
2 3
1, 2, 3,i i i i i i ia D a D a D P⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ≥  
2. Imports of allowances by sector i from domestic market (⊥ iMD ): 
iPD P≥  
3. Exports of allowances by sector i to domestic market (⊥ iXD ): 
iP PD≥  
17 
4. Imports of allowances by sector i from international market (⊥ iM ): 
iP P≥  
5. Exports of allowances by sector i to international market (⊥ iX ): 
iP P≥  
 
Market Clearance Conditions 
6. Market clearance for abatement by sector i (⊥ iP ): 
i i iD M MD+ + ≥ Targetir i iX XD+ +  
7. Market clearance for domestically tradable allowances (⊥ iPD ): 
i ii i
XD MD≥∑ ∑  
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Appendix B: GAMS Programming Code 
$TITLE Analysis of EU Hybrid Carbon Regulation 
 
$ontext 
======================================================================================== 
GAMS source code to replicate results of 
 
  ZEW Discussion Paper 04-40: 
The Efficiency Costs of Separating Carbon Markets under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme:  
  A Quantitative Assessment for Germany 
 
Christoph Böhringer, Tim Hoffmann, Casiano Manrique de Lara Peñate 
 
correspondence: boehringer@zew.de 
 
January, 2005 
======================================================================================== 
$offtext 
 
SET r EU region 
 / 
 DEU Germany 
 /; 
 
SET i Segments of economy 
 / 
 DIR Directive sectors 
 NDIR Non-Directive sectors 
 /; 
 
alias(i,j); 
 
SET dir(i) Sectors covered by the EU-ETS Directive /DIR/, 
 ndir(i) Sectors outside the EU-ETS Directive /NDIR/; 
 
TABLE carbonstat(*,*,*)  Benchmark carbon emission summary (in Mt of C) 
* Source: European Energy and Transport - Trends to 2030, European Commission, Brussels   
*   available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030/index_en.htm 
 
      C_90.Total C_05.Total     C_05.DIR    C_05.NDIR    
DEU 257.18      222.44  131.24       91.20 
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* Key: 
* C_90.Total: Total carbon emissions in 1990 by region   
* C_05.Total: Projected total carbon emissions in 2005 by region     
* C_05.DIR: Projected total carbon emissions of Directive sectors in 2005 by region     
* C_05.NDIR: Projected total carbon emissions of Non-Directive sectors in 2005 by region 
 
TABLE mac_coef(*,*,i,*) Exogenous coefficients of MAC function (here: polynomial of third degree)for C 
     a1     a2     a3 
DEU.97.DIR  1.60372   0.00318   0.00042  
DEU.97.NDIR  5.76568   0.08324   0.00095  
 
SCALAR exr Exchange rate - EURO2002 in USD1997  / 1.213 /; 
*. source AMECO: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/   
SCALAR CinCO2 Conversion factor from carbon to carbon dioxide ; 
CinCO2 = 12/44; 
 
* Assign active region and reference year 
$setglobal region DEU 
$setglobal year 05 
 
* Compute percentage reduction targets w.r.t 1990 and 1997 
PARAMETER  cutback(*,*) Percentage reduction targets; 
 
cutback(r,"1990") = eu_bsa(r); 
cutback(r,"%year%") = ROUND(100*(1 - ( (1- cutback(r,"1990")/100)*carbonstat(r,"C_90","Total")) 
     /carbonstat(r,"C_%year%","Total")),1); 
 
OPTION cutback:1:1:1; 
DISPLAY cutback; 
 
PARAMETER target(*,*) Effective carbon emission reduction requirement in Mtons of carbon; 
 
* For initialisation, assign uniform reduction requirements across all sectors 
target(i,r)= carbonstat(r,"C_%year%",i) *  
  (1- carbonstat(r,"C_90","Total")*(1-cutback(r,"1990")/100)/ carbonstat(r,"C_%year%","Total")) 
 
* Assignment of MAC curve coefficients 
* Approximations of MACs: MAC = a1*e + a2*e**2 + a3*e**3 
PARAMETER a1, a2, a3; 
* MAC approximation is based on 1997 GTAP5-data 
a1(i,r)  =mac_coef(r,"97",i,"a1"); 
a2(i,r)  =mac_coef(r,"97",i,"a2"); 
a3(i,r)  =mac_coef(r,"97",i,"a3"); 
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*==== Model Definition (as a Mixed Complementarity Problem)  
PARAMETER  
 pbar  International emissions price ; 
pbar = 0; 
 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
 p(i)  Marginal abatement cost by sector i  
 pd  Domestic emissions price  
 d(i)  Abatement by sector i  
 x(i)  Exports of allowances by sector i to international market  
 m(i)  Imports of allowances by sector i from international market  
 xd(i)  Exports of allowances by sector i to domestic market 
 md(i)  Imports of allowances by sector i r from domestic market; 
 
FREE VARIABLE 
 tcost  Cost of carbon mitigation; 
 
EQUATIONS 
 mkt_p(i)  Market clearance for abatement by sector i 
 mkt_pd  Market clearance for domestically tradable allowances 
 zprf_d(i)  Zero profit condition for abatement of sector i 
 zprf_m(i)  Zero profit condition for allowance imports of sector i from international market 
 zprf_x(i)  Zero profit condition for allowance exports of sector i r to international market 
 zprf_md(i) Zero profit condition for allowance imports of sector i from domestic market 
 zprf_xd(i) Zero profit condition for allowance exports of sector i to domestic market 
 totalcost  Total compliance cost definition ; 
 
mkt_p(i)..  d(i)  + m(i) + md(i) =e= target(i,"%region%") + x(i) +xd(i) ; 
mkt_pd..   sum(i, xd(i))  =e= sum(i, md(i)) ; 
zprf_m(i)..  pbar   =e= p(i); 
zprf_x(i)..  p(i)   =e= pbar; 
zprf_md(i)..  pd   =e= p(i); 
zprf_xd(i)..  p(i)   =e= pd; 
zprf_d(i)..  a1(i,"%region%")*d(i) + a2(i,"%region%")*d(i)**2 + a3(i,"%region%")*d(i)**3 =e= 
      p(i); 
totalcost..  tcost =e= sum( (i), (1/2)*a1(i,"%region%")*d(i)**2  
     + (1/3)*a2(i,"%region%")*d(i)**3   
     + (1/4)*a3(i,"%region%")*d(i)**4  ); 
 
MODEL  simac /mkt_p.p, mkt_pd.pd, zprf_d.d, zprf_m.m, zprf_x.x, zprf_md.md, zprf_xd.xd /; 
 
 
